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ABSTRACT 
Scores that require participants to negotiate inter-personal 
relationships during performance encourage the development of 
individual and collective strategies for decision-making as part of the 
performance practice. Such strategies might be codified through rules 
specified in the score or developed more informally through the 
preferences of the performers. In both cases, models drawn from 
decision-making theory can be usefully applied to help explain the 
ways in which composers initiate these processes and how 
performers respond to them. In particular, heuristics suggest possible 
explanations for the ways in which such pieces operate in practice. A 
heuristic is a useful decision-making strategy that “ignores part of the 
information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, 
frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods” (Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454). By reducing the amount of information 
to be considered, there is a corresponding reduction in the cognitive 
effort required to make a decision.  
This paper considers the creative potential for heuristics as a 
compositional strategy. It explores implicit uses of heuristics in work 
by Christian Wolff and Joseph Kudirka, as well as my own recent 
music. It examines how performer decisions in such pieces create 
different modes of interaction between individuals and rules. The 
practice presented in the paper provides possible models for 
embodying heuristics, and decision-making theories more generally, 
as a compositional strategy. I contend that defined heuristics are 
present in existing compositions where performers are required to 
make judgments based on available information, and that composers 
have deployed such heuristics intuitively. By making links between 
current heuristics theory and compositional practice, as well as 
showing how such theory might actively inform the creation of new 
work, the paper suggests future possibilities for creative practice.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Scores that require participants to negotiate 
inter-personal relationships during performance encourage the 
development of individual and collective strategies for 
decision-making as part of the performance practice. Such 
strategies might be codified through rules specified in the 
score or developed more informally through the preferences 
of the performers. In both cases, models drawn from 
decision-making theory can be usefully applied to help 
explain the ways in which composers initiate these processes 
and how performers respond to them. In particular, heuristics 
suggest possible explanations for the ways in which such 
pieces operate in practice. A heuristic is a useful 
decision-making strategy that “ignores part of the information, 
with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, 
and/or accurately than more complex methods” (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454). By reducing the amount of 
information to be considered, there is a corresponding 
reduction in the cognitive effort required to make a decision. 
While some previous research has posited that heuristics 
produce more errors in comparison with logical and statistical 
models as a result of the “accuracy-effort trade-off” (Gilovich, 
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2009; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982), recent studies have shown that heuristics outperform 
such rational methods in environments to which they are 
“ecologically rational” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). In 
particular, heuristics are suited to environments where some 
relevant information is unknown, contrasting the use of 
rational methods in the bounded laboratory conditions of 
“small worlds” with the need to find ways to address the 
complexity of “large worlds” (Binmore, 2007). 
This paper considers the creative potential for heuristics 
as a compositional strategy. It explores implicit uses of 
heuristics in work by Christian Wolff and Joseph Kudirka, as 
well as my own recent music. It examines how performer 
decisions in such pieces create different modes of interaction 
between individuals and rules. The practice presented here 
provides possible models for embodying heuristics, and 
decision-making theories more generally, as a compositional 
strategy. I contend that defined heuristics are present in 
existing compositions where performers are required to make 
judgments based on available information, and that composers 
have deployed such heuristics intuitively. By making links 
between current heuristics theory and compositional practice, 
as well as showing how such theory might actively inform the 
creation of new work, this paper suggests future possibilities 
for creative practice.  
II. HEURISTICS 
According to Gerd Gigerenzer, heuristics are composed 
of three building blocks that have specific functions in 
decision-making: search rules, stopping rules, and decision 
rules (Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 43). Gigerenzer splits search rules 
into two categories: the search for alternatives, and the search 
for cues. The search for alternatives derives from Herbert 
Simon’s concept of satisficing (1956, p. 136) in which the 
“search process goes on until a satisfactory alternative is 
found that reaches or surpasses the aspiration levels on the 
goal variables, and then this alternative is taken” (Selten, 2002, 
p. 14). In this model, a search continues until an option is 
presented which will suffice: it may not be the perfect option, 
but it is satisfactory. The alternatives are not known in 
advance, but the criteria for their recognition allow them to be 
found. The search for cues operates within an environment 
where the alternatives are known in advance, and their 
recognition terminates the search. Stopping rules are the 
conditions that terminate each search and “involve simple 
criteria that are easily ascertained” (Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 44) 
and decision rules determine what happens when the search is 
stopped. The different ways in which these building blocks 
are configured defines individual heuristics.  
As an example, in the take-the-best heuristic cues are 
compared in a ranked sequence until such a comparison can 
discriminate between available options. In a study of which of 
two residential properties was more likely to be burgled on the 
basis of eight cues (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009), 
professional burglars judged the presence of an alarm system 
to be the most important factor. If one property had an alarm 
and the other did not, then the non-alarmed property would be 
selected. If both or neither property had an alarm then 
discrimination using that cue was not possible, so the second 
ranked cue (location of the property on the corner or in the 
middle of the street) was used, and so on. The search rule here 
is cue-based (does one property have an alarm? is one 
property on the corner?), the stopping rule is activated when 
the search rule can discriminate between a pair of properties, 
and the decision rule indicates the action to be undertaken on 
termination of the search (burgling the property, or not).  
Gigerenzer also introduces the notion of ecological 
rationality as a way to assess “the match between a strategy 
and an environment” (Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 46). He notes that 
such a match results in “adaptive decisions that combine 
accuracy with speed and frugality” and that heuristics are 
more robust “when environments are noisy and information is 
scarce.” In particular, where a heuristic is ecologically rational 
it produces results that match or exceed those of more 
computationally-intensive and time-consuming methods 
(Gigerenzer et al., 2002). Shah and Oppenheimer (2008, p. 
209) propose five distinct methods used by heuristics to 
increase the efficiency of decision-making in this way:  
 
1. Examining fewer cues. 
2. Reducing the difficulty associated with retrieving and 
storing cue values. 
3. Simplifying the weighting principles for cues. 
4. Integrating less information. 
5. Examining fewer alternatives. 
 
In summary, heuristics reduce the amount of information, or 
simplify the structuring of that information, that is minimally 
necessary to make decisions in order to “employ a minimum 
of time, knowledge and computation to make adaptive choices 
in real environments” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 2001, p. 14).  
III. RULE-BASED COMPOSITIONS 
One such real environment is found in compositions that 
require performers to make decisions based on cues in live 
performance. Typically such pieces use verbally-expressed 
rules which tend to be internalized by the performers during 
rehearsal and preparation, and then activated in the 
performance, often from memory. The rules might govern the 
way performers respond to the events that unfold during the 
performance, controlling anything from individual moments 
through to entire pieces. Given the possible complexity of 
musical performance as an environment, heuristics are useful 
because they enable performers to focus on critical 
information while ignoring other features.   
A clear example can be seen in Christian Wolff’s For 
Pianist (1959). In one passage the performer is asked to make 
a sound which is “as soft as possible”, and then determine 
whether the sound was “inaudible”, “as soft as possible” or 
“louder than as soft as possible” (see Figure 1). The result of 
this assessment routes the next part of the music to three 
different sequences of material. Given the comparative nature 
of this decision, a good model is the similarity heuristic which 
Read and Grushka-Cockayne (2011, p. 25) note  
 
can be used whenever a classification decision is to 
be made, when the object or event can be placed into 
one of two or more categories, and it is possible to 
assess the similarity of the object or event to 
members of each category.  
 
So here the pianist must assess the similarity of the amplitude 
of their resultant sound to the three specified categories. The 
decision is a simple one in that it isolates one parameter as a 
basis for the judgment. It is however somewhat indefinite as a 
criterion and it relies on the subjective judgment of the pianist. 
The range of amplitudes that might qualify as “as soft as 
possible” may vary between pianists and pianos, and may be 
altered by the immediate context. Here the event occurs 
Figure 1: Christian Wolff - For Pianist (1959), excerpt 
approximately 1.5 seconds after a loud sound which is left to 
decay and a subsequent constellation of seven other sounds, 
any of which might alter the perception of amplitude for the 
cue sound. The heuristic building blocks here are quite 
straightforward though: the search rule looks for an amplitude 
cue in the sound; the stopping rule is activated by the 
assessment of the sound after its production (the search is 
complete); and the decision rule evaluates the amplitude and 
triggers the consequent sequence of sounds. The decision is 
therefore contingent on the perception of the sound and 
subsequent interpretation of the criterion by the pianist. 
In contrast, in Joseph Kudirka’s harmony (2007) the 
cues are more explicit (see Figure 2). Three tones are sounded, 
with one tone periodically dropping out. A new tone replaces 
it, and the rules specify the placing of the tone in relation to 
the remaining two: either above, between, or below them. 
Whereas in the Wolff the search rule looks for the relative 
amplitude of the sound with the consequent subjectivity that 
creates, in Kudirka’s piece it assesses whether the tone that 
has just stopped was the highest, middle, or lowest of the 
three that were sounding. While subtle microtonal 
differentiation in the played pitches or a poor sense of relative 
pitch might make this task difficult, it is nonetheless more 
quantifiable than that presented in the Wolff. Kudirka’s piece 
also has a more open decision rule. In the Wolff, the decision 
is based on the assessment of similarity to the three categories, 
requiring comparison in order to reach a decision. In harmony 
the player is presented with two options for the new tone and 
must make a straight choice. So if the stopped tone was the 
highest, then the new tone should either be the middle or 
lowest tone. There is no information given as to how this 
choice should be made however. This reveals a more covert 
use of decision making where a heuristic is not explicitly 
encoded in the rules, but rather where one must be employed 
in order to make the required decision. The player must first 
“decide how to decide” (Goldstein et al., 2002, p. 183). So in 
this example the player must choose whether to play a pitch 
that is between the two that are sounding, or below them. 
There are two possibilities, and heuristics such as 
take-the-first, the fluency heuristic or the recognition heuristic 
may be employed here. Each of these heuristics is a method 
for selecting between two options. In the recognition heuristic, 
“if one of two alternatives is recognized and the other is not, 
then infer that the recognized alternative has the higher value 
with respect to the criterion” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, 
p. 460). Here, if a difficult judgment needs to be made 
regarding placing a tone between two others–they may be 
very close together for instance–then it may be that the lower 
option is selected as it is only this one that is recognized. In 
take-the-first, the first or only option that comes to mind is 
selected. Take-the-first is useful in this respect as “part of 
recognizing or categorizing a situation as typical is to recall 
what to do in that situation”, such that options may “come to 
mind in order of quality” (Goldstein et al., 2002, p. 177). Here, 
the ease of playing a lower tone may be thought of first, and 
therefore selected. With the fluency heuristic “If two objects, 
a and b, are recognized, and one of two objects is more 
fluently retrieved, then infer that this object has the higher 
value with respect to the criterion” (Hertwig, Herzog, 
Schooler, & Reimer, 2008, p. 1192). This may apply if the 
possibility of playing either the middle or lower tone is 
recognized, but that it is potentially easier (more fluent) to 
play the lower tone, hence more value is attached to that 
option. In this example, there is no significant sense of utility 
attached to the decision however. The effectiveness of 
take-the-first is limited where there are “low costs for making 
errors” (Goldstein et al., 2002, p. 177). Being caught in the 
middle of a burglary is not at stake here. Equally, the use of 
the recognition heuristic may also vary over time and affect 
the choices of other players as by continuously prioritizing 
one of the choices it might “assure [it] a place in the 
recognition memory of others” (Goldstein et al., 2002, p. 178). 
Success is measured here in relation to the rules of the piece. 
There are two correct responses in this situation: play the 
middle or lowest tone, not the highest tone. Players may 
consider their chance of success is therefore more likely if the 
lower pitch is played. 
Figure 2: Joseph Kudirka - harmony (2007) 
This question of utility is central to the use of 
decision-making processes in rule-based compositions. While 
the outcomes of decisions in performance will not determine 
anything as significant as, for example, whether someone has 
had a heart attack or if it is advisable to get married 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 2001, pp. 3-8), they are important within 
the context of the piece. By not following the rules, the piece 
is not realized according to the composer’s intent, however 
open the result might be. This is a common problem in 
realizations of open scores, where flexibility can lead to 
ambivalence for the outcome where errors may not be 
noticeable. One way to counteract this is to give value to the 
outcome of the decision in a way that is apparent to observers.  
I attempt to do this in my piece all voices are heard 
(2015), where the results of players’ decisions become 
apparent to listeners (see Figure 3). The piece models 
consensus decision-making, best known as the means through 
which Quaker meetings are conducted. In the piece, players 
simultaneously play a sequence of sounds chosen from a 
limited set of sources to which all have access. This event 
repeats, with players electing each time to undertake one of 
four actions: 
 
1. play the same material as that which they played on the 
previous downbeat 
2. play material that matches what another player played 
on the previous downbeat 
3. play something new 
4. remain silent 
 
The aim is to achieve consensus, defined here as all players 
playing the same sound “in unison such that they are in 
agreement as to its uniformity” (or remaining silent). The 
degree of similarity is negotiable however, opening up the 
process to different levels of rigour in the application of this 
criterion. So two whistle sounds might be acceptable for one 
player, whereas two C sharp whistle sounds might be required 
by another, while the C sharp whistles with matched duration, 
envelope and timbral distortion might be necessary for a third 
player. This criterion is negotiated non-verbally by the 
players.  
The building blocks in all voices are heard focus on 
developing the best strategy to achieve group consensus in a 
future state of the piece. The search rule requires players to 
assess what the other players are doing. The stopping rule 
activates once this assessment has been made, and the 
decision rule articulates the response by each player in the 
next event that is most likely to promote consensus. There is 
however more autonomy here as a number of different 
strategies are valid, and players may exert more agency in the 
decision-making process. So for example, one player might 
decide that they want all other players to conform to their 
sound and only play option 1. Conversely another player 
might always try to conform to the majority sound, aiming to 
reinforce that to achieve consensus and play only option 2. In 
both cases the players are trying to achieve the same aim, but 
their strategies differ and are evidenced by the decisions they 
make. This may derive from an application of the 
take-the-best heuristic. Searching through the current texture 
and checking each of the four decisions in order until a 
satisfactory match is made would present a workable strategy. 
al l  voices are heard (2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each player needs a large number of instruments and/or objects capable of producing sustained sounds. Every player should have an identical collection of 
instruments and/or objects.  
 
The aim is to reach group consensus.  
Consensus is achieved by all contributing players playing a statement in unison such that they are in agreement as to its uniformity.  
Players must determine if the similarity is sufficient to constitute consensus.  
When consensus is reached, the sequence is complete.  
A performance may comprise any number of such sequences.  
 
A sequence comprises a series of statements. 
One player cues the beginning of each statement.  
At the first cue, all players play their opening material.  
At the second cue, and on each subsequent cue until consensus is reached, players may do one of the following: 
1. play the same material as that which they played at the previous cue 
2. play material that matches what another player played at the previous cue 
3. play something new 
4. remain silent 
 
The material comprises any configuration of short sounds played on the available instruments and/or objects. The material may comprise one or more sounds. 
 
If a player chooses to remain silent for a statement, that player takes no further part in that sequence, but may join in for the next sequence. 
 
 
James Saunders 
April-May, 2015 
Figure 3: James Saunders - all voices are heard (2015) 
A rank ordering of these decisions might be: 1. remain silent; 
2. play matching material; 3. play the same material; 4. play 
something new. These will promote consensus with 
decreasing likelihood. In all voices are heard players’ 
decisions must, therefore, take into account both the stated 
aim of the process and the likely responses of the other 
players. This suggests a game situation, given the presence of 
an interactive goal-directed challenge with conflicting 
competitors that creates meaning (Costikyan, 2002; Crawford, 
2003). Both utility, with its consequent potential for analysis, 
and playfulness may emerge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The examples presented here suggest some possibilities 
for embodying heuristics in rule-based compositions. In the 
Wolff a subjective assessment of similarity forces a choice 
from three possibilities. In the Kudirka there is a free choice 
from two options, inflected by the complexity of the context. 
In my piece the decision is governed by the strategy that, in 
each player’s view, is most likely to attain the stated goal. 
These examples show some of the possible ways in which 
heuristics and decision-making processes more generally are 
embodied within some rule-based compositions. There seems 
to be two principal approaches: either to encode a specific 
heuristic in the rules themselves, or to present 
decision-making scenarios that require performers to establish 
a way to make decisions. While there are perhaps no explicit 
examples of the former as interdisciplinary collaboration 
between composers and heuristics researchers is currently 
under-developed, examples such as the Wolff demonstrate 
that such approaches have been used intuitively in the past. 
The second approach is more common, with many rule-based 
compositions presenting a series of decisions that performers 
must make, such as in the Kudirka and my piece. Here there is 
great scope for further consideration of the ways performers 
might make these decisions, generating a better understanding 
of such behaviours as a means to inform creative practice.  
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